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Abstract
The author in this study does not intend to provide a comprehensive
account of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, in part because the cur-
rent level of research does not enable this.  The only way to understand
this conflict is through facts, not prejudices.  However, such prejudices are
particularly acute amongst Muslim-Bosniac authors.  They base their
claims on the notion that Serbs and Croats are the destroyers of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, and that both are equally culpable in its destruction.
Relying on mainly unpublished and uncited documents from the three
constitutive nations of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the author factually chal-
lenges basic and generally accepted claims.  The author offers alternative
responses to certain claims and draws attention to the complexity of the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which has been mainly viewed in terms
of black or white.  The author does, however, suggest that in considering
the character of the war it is necessary to examine first the war in Croatia
and the inter-relationship between the two.  The main focus is on 1992
and the Muslim and Croat differences that developed into open conflict
at the beginning of 1993.  The role of the international community in the
war and the partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina are also discussed.
At the end of the 20th century in Europe and the eclipse of
Communism from the world political scene, it is not easy to trace
the indelible marks left behind after the collapse of Yugoslavia and
the wars that ensued.  Within fifty years Yugoslavia ceased to exist
for a second time, this time it appears to be permanent or at least
for an indefinite period.  The first of these wars, the war in
Slovenia, in contrast to the war in Croatia, and even more so the
war in Bosnia and Herzegovina, was a serious maneuver and not
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a conflict between nations and ideologies.  The intensity and bru-
tality of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina caught the world’s
attention, a war taking place in civilized Europe.
During the course of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina there
were attempts to interpret its nature, which vulgarized the conflict
in terms of black and white, good and evil akin to bad literature
or B-grade films.  For example, Mustafa Imamoviæ, professor at
the Faculty of Law in Sarajevo, stated: “The aggression against
Bosnia and Herzegovina was organized and planned in detail and
implemented in the spring of 1992 by Serbia and Montenegro
(so-called Yugoslavia), with the active support of Bosnian and
Herzegovinian Chetniks.  At the end of 1992 and the beginning
of 1993, as an aggressor Croatia joined in, with the support of
the Ustashi elements within the Croatian Defense Council
(HVO).”1 Imamoviæs statement captures the key element in
Muslim-Bosniac publications on the subject of the war in Bosnia
and Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995.  This key element is
in many ways questionable.  The significance of this interpretation,
especially in its most “sensitive” aspects, of the Muslim-Croat con-
flict is the claim that the entire war is understood from the per-
spective of the second half of 1993.
The war from 1991/92 to 1995 in many ways appeared to
be the continuation of nothing more than the darkness of World
War II, its conclusion determining the history of the socialist
(republic) of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  During the Second World
War each constitutive nation found itself divided along two oppos-
ing sides, while the Bosniac-Muslims found themselves divided
into three, or four sides as it has recently been asserted.  The sim-
ilarities to the Second World War are visible also in the way in
which the conflict has been interpreted.  In much the same way as
1941 was viewed as the “defining” year in which everything
began and nothing good was occurred before it, except for the
“painful” experiences of the victor.  Now 1991 and 1992 are
taken as starting points.  The period before 1991 was “difficult
and unjust” for all three constitutive nations of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  Clearly this interpretation is unfounded.
During World War II the Serbs were separated into the
Chetniks and the Partizans.  Their participation grew constantly in
the Partizans as the war closed, and in the Bosnia and
Herzegovina Partizan contingent they constituted a majority.  The
Muslims spent the war mainly in the formations of the home-
guard/domobrani and the Ustashi forces of the Independent State
of Croatia (NDH).  They also participated in the local police forces
under the auspices of the military formations of the NDH,
although today there is an attempt to give them an “independent”
character.2 The participation of the Muslims in the Partizans of


























of 1942.  However, there were only a few units with Muslim major-
ity participation, to that we can accept the Partizan terminology to
describe them as equivalent “divisions” or infantry brigades, so
that for the sake of precision we can use the language of the reg-
ular army.3 A small number of Muslims found themselves in the
ranks of Serbian nationalist Chetniks, which is a paradox because
they mostly victimized Muslims during the war.
The Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina as the least numerous
nation during the entire war remained loyal to radical
Croatianhood, while their participation in the Partizans was only
symbolic, even when the latter mobilized on a large scale near the
end of the war.4  During the war Bosnian Croats only constituted
a majority within a single “brigade,” that is an infantry unit.  Akin
to the Muslim unit, this unit also carried a national name, which
was not the case for the partizan forces in which Bosnian Serbs
were a majority.  
After the Second World War, Serbs and Muslims who distin-
guished themselves in the war were given the responsibility for
maintaining brotherhood and unity in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In this context, their role and orientation during the war between
1941-1945 was gradually “forgotten.” In contrast, the Croats
were subjected to systematic repressive measures after the war
because of the side they took.5 The war between Croats and
Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina during 1993 demonstrated
the full extent of this forgetfulness.  In light of the fact that the his-
tory of socialistic Yugoslavia is only becoming a problem for his-
toriography, an analysis of inter-national relations and the degree
of “equality” of the constitutive nations can be seen in the popu-
lation census.  The census reveals that the percentage of Croats
after the Second World War constantly decreased, falling from 25
percent to 17.5 percent.  This fact speaks volumes about the
incongruity between the stated and reality.6 This analysis also
includes the cultural position, economic representation amongst
other factors of Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  This is all nec-
essary background to understand the drama of war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  However, this should be the subject of other histor-
ical studies.
The recent decades of socialism in Bosnia and Herzegovina
are significant because of the articulation of a national “senti-
ment” of Muslims, which unfortunately has often been given vul-
gar interpretations in the social sciences.  However, the advocates
of this notion are a small “elite” segment of the population hold-
ing out to be intellectuals.  It seems that the foundation stone of
this process can be found in the Encyclopedia Yugoslavia in the
following formulation: “It seems that the powerful tribe Bosna set-
tled in central Bosnia after the migrations, then a part of Roman




























scandal within academic circles when it appeared, it remained a
part of the encyclopedia and is today considered the basis of the
pre-history of the Muslims.  This was one of the most foresighted
moves in this region.  We now can read in The History of
Bosniacs that “in the literature there are views that the Slavs that
settled in the area of central or original Bosnia brought that name
with them, like other ancient Slavic tribes, namely the Croats and
Serbs.  Therefore, from the Slavic pre-homeland, somewhere from
Karpata, the Bosna tribe lived or a tribe older bearing the name
Bosna.”8 Even though such assertions are amusing to experts in
the field of medieval Bosnian history, they are published in large
numbers in popular books which have acquired the status of
“capital intellectual works,”9 comparable to the reputation of
Vjekoslav Klaiæ’s The History of Croats shared by Croats.
Translated into the idiom of this issue, to justify the assertion
that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country exclusively for Muslims-
Bosniacs it was necessary to find their “presence” in Bosnia and
Herzegovina from the early Middle Ages.  On this basis, a chrono-
logical projection was formulated for Bosnia (early Middle
Ages)—the Bogomils (Middle Ages)—Muslims (Ottoman
epoch)—Bosniacs (from Austria-Hungry until today).  The chronol-
ogy served to grapple with historical sources already demonstrat-
ing them as Croats or Serbs, as the only South Slavic tribes that
arrived in this area with a degree of proto-state organization and
awareness of themselves that differentiated them from others.10
This is how medieval Bosnia became an important foundation
stone in the hastened creation of a Muslim-Bosniac historical
mosaic.  The time period relating to this problem in the last fifteen
year speaks clearly about the nature of the motives involved.11
Until recently, this issue was in principle of no concern for Bosniac-
Muslims, whose scientific interest in the history of Bosnia and
Herzegovina was limited to the 15th century, when the Ottomans
arrived in this area and the end of medieval Bosnia.  Indeed, dur-
ing socialistic Yugoslavia, this period of history was mainly of
interest to Serbian historians on both sides of the Drina river.  Their
work was the extended hand of state interests in order to
demonstrate the similarities between Serbia and Bosnia.12
Croatian studies of the medieval period after 1945 were directed
towards religious and cultural issues, which reflected political
changes after the Second World War in which it was undesirable
to focus on the political issue of mediaeval Bosnia.  The rare study
of this issue, whether within a branch of historiography or not, was
exclusively along the lines of AVNOJ Yugoslavia, that is, clearly


























The Eclipse of the “Idols”
The victory of nationalist parties in the first multiparty elections
clearly demonstrates that the Communist, internationalist
Yugoslavism was a surrogate that failed to permanently blunt
nationalism, or more precisely chauvinism, which remained dor-
mant until its first opportunity to resurface.  The Muslim Party of
Democratic Action (SDA) brought together a majority of the
largest section of the population on the basis of preserving
’Bosnia and Herzegovina as a separate political community, irre-
spective of whether it would or in which manner be incorporated
in some broader state-legal framework’ and the widest possible
Islamization of ’all aspects of life, aimed at creating a completely
Islamic society.’14 The Serbian Democratic Party (SDS), the party
of Bosnian Serbs that bore the same name and initials as the party
of Croatian Serbs in Croatia, harbored more ambitious desires
ideologically and numerically in relation to the other two nations
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Both Serb parties were part of a
broader Serbian movement whose center was in Belgrade.  Its
objective can be described by the famous expression ’all Serbs in
one state,’ which demonstrates the dismissal of existing republican
borders and the establishment of ethnic borders.  The party of
Croats in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Croatian Democratic
Union (HDZ) carried the same name as its counterpart party in
Croatia.  It was expected to be a response to the idea of unified
Serbdom.  In contrast to the largest segment of the party leader-
ship in the first phase of its organization, prewar phase of its exis-
tence its supporters clearly looked towards Zagreb and the
Croatian President Dr. Franjo Tuðman.  The HDZ advocated a
decentralized form of power in Yugoslavia through the trans-
formation of the country into a confederation, the continuation
of internal republican borders, and in the event that the con-
federation failed, the only option was the withdrawal out of
Yugoslavia, as well as the equality of the three constitutive
nations.15 The parties individually sought to organize power upon
the model of trilateral separation, which analysis s at the time
pointed out that such a model was unnatural and incompatible
with democratic standards, and therefore, dysfunctional.16 As
a result, it was clear that the nationalist parties after they appeared
on the historical scene demonstrated that their perspectives on the
future of Bosnia and Herzegovina were incompatible.  This should
have been of no surprise because this has been the problem in
past and remains the problem today.
War before “war”
The war in Croatia between 1991 and 1992 affected Croats
in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the same way that it affects157
Croatians.  The attack on Croatia was understood as an attack on
Croats as a whole, and the Serbs as the attackers were identified
without distinction throughout Yugoslavia.  Many Croats from
Bosnia and Herzegovina volunteered to fight in the war.  This was
also the case with Bosnian Serbs, but in much larger numbers.
They saw themselves as the rest of the Serbs did, as the defenders
of Yugoslavia.  The role of Muslims from Bosnia and Herzegovina
in the war on the Serbian side was mainly in the form of the offi-
cer corps of the Yugoslav Army, new recruits beginning their mili-
tary service in the army and reservists mobilized by the Yugoslav
People’s Army (JNA).  On the Croatian side, there were volunteers
in the Croatian National Guard of the Republic of Croatia (ZNG
RH).  However, it seems that in both cases they did not constitute
a significant percentage,17 particularly compared to the role of
Bosnia and Herzegovina as a staging ground for the JNA’s attack
on Croatia.  The Bosnian Krajina and eastern Herzegovina were
the bases for attacks on western Slavonia and southern Croatia
from the Neretva river to Prevlaka.  The Commander of the
Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina (TO BH) even gave
soldiers from Bosnia and Herzegovina a supplement to their
wages without the knowledge or approval of the Presidency of
the SRBH ... from the budget of the Republican Headquarters
of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia and Herzegovina.18 At this
point, the republican sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
such that it raises the legitimate question whether in fact it existed
at all.
As stated previously, Bosnia and Herzegovina was not in a
position to protect its local population, and to large extent
became the staging area for attacks against the Republic of
Croatia.  In addition to using the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, the JNA also attacked Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, as witnessed by the destruction of Croatian settle-
ments in eastern Herzegovina.  The destruction of the village of
Ravno became the symbol of suffering of these settlements.19  Here
we have the primary problem or issue, the issue for Croatia
whether Bosnia and Herzegovina was the aggressor?  Bosnia and
Herzegovina became the operational area for JNA attacks against
Croatia, which was made up of members from the local popula-
tion that blindly accepted Belgrade as the unquestionable politi-
cal center.  Apart from the bordering areas inhabited by Croats
(Posavina and western Herzegovina with Livno and Tomislavgrad),
the rest of Bosnia and Herzegovina’s border and deep hinterland
became a war zone with at least two operational directions.  The
territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina played an unfavorable role
for Croatia in extraordinary operational basis that the JNA failed
to exploit for their own strategic objectives.  This fact is very often

























and Herzegovina held different positions regarding the war in
Croatia.  Croats and Serbs participated, while the Muslims tried
to remain on the side lines in accordance with Alija Izetbegoviæ’s
famous statement that ’this is not our war.’20
If we understand Bosnia and Herzegovina as a territory that
functioned in accordance with its current territory since the period
between 1878 and 1918, and from 1945 to 1991, then we can
conclude that Bosnia and Herzegovina survived on the basis of its
special status.  It is significant that this status, which was the guar-
antee of its survival (indivisibility), came from outside the borders
of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Within the Austro-Hungarian
Monarchy, Bosnia and Herzegovina fell within the authority of a
joint ministry.  In socialistic Yugoslavia, Bosnia and Herzegovina
was placed between Croatian and Serbian national questions,
which led to the emergence of the Muslim question near the end
of Yugoslavia’s existence.21 At the end of the 80s the guaranteed
“equality” that held Bosnia and Herzegovina at bay began to
wade, ceasing to exist by late autumn 1991.  
Precursors of Dissolution
The war in 1992 had its political roots in the second half of
1991.  In political terms, the Bosnian Serbs on October 24, 1991
founded the Serbian People’s Assembly of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.22 On the basis of the plebiscite of a Serb nation in
Bosnia and Herzegovina held on October 9-10, 1991, the
Serbian Autonomous Region in Bosnia and Herzegovina was pro-
claimed on October 21, 1991.23 The next step was to pass the
Decision on efforts towards the establishment of the Srpska
Republika of Bosnia and Herzegovina on December 21, 1991,
which was in fact founded on January 9, 1992.24 This initiated the
process of reorganizing and destroying the central authority of
republican institutions in one section of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
In addition to the Bosnian Serbs, Croats in Bosnia and
Herzegovina also saw the need for the reorganization within the
republic, which was being reduced on a daily basis.  Meeting in
Grude on November 12, 1991, the presidents of the crisis head-
quarters of the Herzegovinian and Travnik regional communities
concluded that that the Croatian nation in Bosnia and
Herzegovina must finally pass a decisive, active policy on
realizing the centuries dream of a joint Croatian state.  While
this conclusion demonstrates the strategy adopted by Croats in
Bosnia and Herzegovina towards the establishment of a sover-
eign Croatia in her ethnic and historical (currently possible)
borders,25 six days later they rejected the decisions with the
Decision on the establishment of the Croatian Community
Herceg-Bosna.  This resolution specified that the Community ...



























Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina as long as the state inde-
pendence of Bosnia and Herzegovina exists in relation to for-
mer Yugoslavia or any other Yugoslavia.26
The Decision on the sovereignty of Bosnia and
Herzegovina passed by the republican assembly on October 15,
1991 stipulates, inter alia, that Bosnia and Herzegovina ... will
develop as a civic republic, sovereign and indivisible state.  In
the conflict between Serbia and Croatia, Bosnia and
Herzegovina will remain neutral, but it can only remain within
a Yugoslav community if Serbia and Croatia also remain.27
This resolution reflects the position of the Bosnian Muslims. For
the other two nations, this position was an anachronism.
Yugoslavia was in the process of dissolution, and Bosnia and
Herzegovina was Yugoslavia in small.  The Bosnian Muslims were
neither enemies nor allies of the Croats or Serbs.  This relation-
ship continued until April 1992 with the turning of a new page in
the history of Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
On the Threshold of War
The period immediately before the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina was characterized by preparations by the parties for
war.  The intensity of these preparations was not the same for all
the parties because their respective points of departures were dif-
ferent.  The dominant SDS as the Serbian party received its
weapons from the Serbianized JNA.  The Croats through the HDZ
also received weapons, but in significantly lower quantities than
the Serbs.  However, the Croats received enough to completely
erase any sense of inferiority after the JNA disarmed the
Republican Territorial Defense forces.  The Muslims were in a
much more unfavorable position, in part because they found
themselves stuck between political leaders and nations, even
though they made plans for this very early on.  The Muslim
Patriotic League was created on May 2, 1991, which could then
only be treated as a party based paramilitary group.  On June 10,
1991 in the Sarajevo Police Offices (Dom) at a meeting of the
leading Bosnian officials from Yugoslavia, under the auspices of
the SDA, the Council for National Defense of the Muslim Nation
was established and the Patriotic League remained its military
component.28 The political scene in Bosnia and Herzegovina
resembled the political situation in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia
from the era of Dragiša Cvetkoviæ and Vladko Maèek, when the
political representatives29 of the Serbs and Croats sought to
resolve their most important problems while the Muslims were
placed to ’one side’.
The shared element in the ’race towards arms’ was its ethnic
principle.  Each party armed themselves individually.  During a

























Mehuriæ near Travnik held on February 7/8, 1992, it was decid-
ed that the League had at its disposal between 60 and 70 thou-
sand armed members.  By the end of February, the Directive on
the defense of the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina was
adopted.  The directive specified that the Patriotic League consid-
er that the SDS along with the Yugoslav army and the extrem-
ist wing of the HDZ are the destructive factors in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  The directive charged the Patriotic League with the
responsibility to protect the Muslim nation, preserve the integri-
ty and wholeness of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to secure
the further common life of all the nations and nationalities on
the state territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Article 3 of the
directive called upon the people of Sandzak, Kosovo and
Macedonia to join our just struggle and immediately begin the
struggle to undermine the power of the enemy and weaken
their offensive capacity on the territory of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  At the same time, it is necessary to establish
contacts, cooperation and coordination in joint platform with
the Croatian nation in Bosnia and Herzegovina against the
common enemy.30  Compared to the beginning of the month
when the decision referred to the “extremist wing of the HDZ,” this
was large step forward. 
The War
After the relaxation of military activity in Croatia at the begin-
ning of 1992, it was feasible to consider that the conditions for
separating the front lines could be separated along republican,
that is state borders.  However, this was not possible primarily
because the war in Croatia had not ended, but only a cease-fire
was in place.  The secession of parts of Croatia inhabited by Serbs
were not incorporated into the legal system of the Republic of
Croatia.  As a result, the state borders in parts of Lika, Banovine
and Kordun could not become state borders.  
The withdrawal of the JNA to Bosnia and Herzegovina began
in the summer of 1991, and the withdrawal of the 14th and 30th
Corps from Slovenia and the 10th and 13th Corps from Croatia
officially should have continued.  Two groups can be identified in
the withdrawal of the JNA.  While one group withdrew from areas
in which it had no physical contact (14th and 30th Corps), a part
went over the border into Bosnia and Herzegovina and continued
with its military activities against Croatia.
The process of opening the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina
began after the relaxation of the conflict in Croatia.  Even at this
point the strategy of the Serbian JNA was clear that it wanted to
solve the two problems separately and to avoid two fronts along
separate lines.  They examined their experiences in Slovenia,



























situation is forthcoming for members of the army and that they
have to begin with an evacuation on more secure grounds.31
The early phase of the war is illustrated by the assessment of
the Command of 2nd VO, which states that: After the recogni-
tion of the sovereignty of Bosnia and Herzegovina by the
European Community, the United States and other states, this
republic was exposed to war with unforeseen tragic conse-
quences.  The escalation of the international armed conflict on
the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina resulted in general
mayhem, chaos, fear and panic by people in various towns
and villages.  The situation is totally unclear, conflictual and in
the final analysis completely unpredictable.  Various armed
groups and armed civilians control certain counties, cities and
settlements.  Murders and mass killings are becoming fre-
quent occurrences, extensive destruction, imprisonment and
maltreatment, suffering and theft and crimes of all sorts are
occurring.  On the entire area not a single political-state insti-
tution is functioning, apart from the JNA.  Life it totally para-
lyzed.  Hunger, social deprivation and all the other scourges
of war are apparent.32 Nothing could be added to this assess-
ment except that the cause of this human drama was the
Serbianized JNA.
As expected, parts of the JNA in Bosnia and Herzegovina
became the armed forces of the Bosnian Serbs, which gave them
an incomparable advantage in the war.33 At the end of May, exist-
ing forces and materiel and technical resources of the JNA were
transformed into the Army of the Srpska Republika of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  They retained similar operational structures in the
previous zones of responsibility and their names were changed
during the month of May and the beginning of June in accor-
dance with their new terminology.34 Although they had over-
whelming superiority in MTSes (materiel and technical resources,
MTS), the Bosnian Serbs encountered problems in human
resources and with parts of its officer corps.  They especially
encountered problems with the latter when General Ratko Mladiæ
in September 1992 complained that from 4206 soldiers from
Bosnia and Herzegovina in the Army of the Srpska Republika, only
900 joined, which was half the required soldiers for the needs of
the Bosnian Serb army.35
Between Objectives and Success
From Serbian ethnic areas in which the MTS and the JNA with-
drew to from Slovenia and Croatia between 1991 and 1992, the
war for mapping out Serbian ethnic space began.  The quickest
successes were made in eastern Bosnia in areas with Muslim

























the successes in Kupres, the JNA suffered a double failure in
Croatian areas around Livno.  Suffering these losses, the JNA tried
to take Sarajevo and the Neretva basin.  At the end of March, dif-
ficult and long battles for the Bosnian Posavina began.  In the
area of the Bosanska krajina where there was no military resist-
ance, the practice of ethnic cleansing and the establishment of
concentration camps began, which spread to other parts of the
Srpska Republika of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It seems that in the first phase of the war the JNA, or rather
from May 21, 1992 the Army of the Srpska Republika of Bosnia
and Herzegovina, attempted to quickly take as much territory as
possible by mobile infantry without utilizing lines accessible by
tank.  On areas that the land-mechanized infantry were unable to
dominate, whether because of the terrain or organized resistance,
their success was greatly reduced.  After this, it required a great
deal of effort and manpower and MTSes to be successful, as
demonstrated in Bosanska Posavina and Jajce.
In an address on the results and the status of the armed
forces, the Main Headquarters of the Army of the Srpska
Republika estimated that they had achieved ... significant
results which could be described as follows:
1. The Army of the Srpska Republika successfully took control
of the front held by the JNA in former Bosnia and
Herzegovina and defended the Serbian nation.
2. Responded to efforts by destructive forces of Yugoslavia to
destroy and eliminate the Serbian nation in the former
Bosnia and Herzegovina or to reduce them to second-
class citizens.
3. Prevented the occupation of territory belonging to the
Srpska Republika, and stopped Ustashe units advancing
along the wide front on the River Drina.
4. Repelled many offensive efforts by the Croatian-Muslim
coalition, assisted by the regular forces of Croatia and
other Western European and Islamic countries in an
attempt to deblockade Sarajevo through Herzegovina and
to cut off the corridor.
5. Operation Corridor  destroyed Ustashi units in Posavina
and Semberia and the operation opened a territorial link
with the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the rest of the
Srpska Republika ....
6. Due to the heroic resistance and high level of conscious-
ness of the Serbian nation, as well as the determination of
the political and military leadership of the Srpska
Republika to continue the struggle to defend Serbianhood
and the creation of our state on the land of our forefathers,
we have achieved a situation in which for the first time



























realize our goals to remain on our own and create a dem-
ocratic community in which all the standards of civilization
and the rights of individuals and citizens are respected.36
In response to the Serbs, in the first phase of the war the
Croats and Muslims sought to consolidate their defense positions.
In this context, the significance of Croatian successes has greater
strategic relevance than those of the JNA for the following basic
reasons.37 The Croat successes were important for both threat-
ened nations because they connected them to Croatia as logistics
and support base.  The military activities of the Croatian army, or
more accurately the Croatian National Guard (ZNG), along the
northern and southern borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina, in
cooperation with the HVO, directly benefited the Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina in the hinterland.  It assisted the Army of Bosnia
and Herzegovina because the military activities disrupted lines
held by the Bosnian Serb army and they enabled logistics and
humanitarian supplies to get through.  In this respect, this impor-
tant aspect seems to be forgotten not only in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, but also in Croatia.
The fall of Bosanska Posavina carries the “pall” of a political
agreement since the autumn of 1992, a betrayal which is based
on the claim that despite a propitious position, Franjo Tudjman
through parallel command channels, ignoring the General
Headquarters of the Croatian Army, ordered the withdrawal of
the Croatian Army and the HVO from parts of Bosanska
Posavina.  This enabled Serbian forces from the direction of
Banja Luka and Bijeljina to merge and establish a corridor as
the vital communication link between Serbia and parts of
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina under Serbian para-
authority.38 However, without a detailed analysis it is undesirable
to draw any far-reaching conclusions.  We are of the opinion that
Posavina was too demanding for the Croatian Army and HVO.
The command structure was a questionable element, as was the
tactic of deploying a large number of armed troops that had dif-
ficulty in reaching a level of unity in the spiritual sense.  Within the
HVO, which at the time resembled more a police force, there were
significant problems of disinterest amongst soldiers in acting out-
side their own areas, especially after they were lost in battle.  The
Army of the Srpska Republika mainly used armored and mecha-
nized troops inherited from the former JNA, whose value was in
heavy firepower and good maneuverability.  These troops were
not identified in time by Croatian army intelligence, which was a
significant mistake because they included 16 mtbr. and 1 okbr
which were of the highest quality troops of the 1st Krajiški Corps.39
This was particularly important for the armored brigades because
of areas assessable by tank, but it seems that the overwhelming

























armored and artillery, so that the opponent could not strike back.40
In the discussions of the battle for Posavina there are only partial
analyses that elide over the fact that battles along the southern
front where also taking place and that parts of the operative
armed forces were dispersed along the areas under the control of
rebel Croatian Serbs.  In addition, the Croatian Army underwent
great changes with the reduction of ten infantry brigades.41
Operation Vrbas 92, which involved a strengthened 30th
Krajiški division of the Army of the Srpska Republika,42 after
months of battle, took Jajce, developed in part parallel with the
battle for Posavina.  The operation demonstrated unambiguously
the extent to which the Bosnian Serbs were dependent on armory
and tanks and that it was limited in its successes when it relied on
infantry troops.  Naturally, the conflict between the HVO and the
Muslims also affected the battle.  However, the suggestion that a
joint Croatian-Bosniac defense coalition collapsed in large part
because of political intrigues within the HDZ of Bosnia and
Herzegovina, reflects more the position(s) of the author(s) than a
true analysis of the facts.43
With the fall of Jajce and Bosanska Posavina, HVO’s war with
the Army of the Srpska Republika literally came to a close.  The
defense of Livno, parts of the Vrbas valley and parts of Central
Bosnia, especially the successes in the Neretva valley, crowned by
operation Dawn of June,44 meant that the HVO came to a stale-
mate with the Serbs.  After this there were only battles for posi-
tioning, erupting occasionally around Usora and parts of the
Posavina battle-lines.  Several meetings between the leaders of the
Bosnian Serbs and Croats outside of Bosnia and Herzegovina did
not lead to any concrete steps forward.45  To summarize events
in 1991 on the side of the Croats, the Head of the Main
Headquarters of HVO concluded that the forces of HVO, in addi-
tion to the problems and difficulties under its control, success-
fully held 70 percent of the free territory in Bosnia and
Herzegovina, and that the creation of its armed forces on the
area of the Croatian Community of Herceg-Bosna, the
Croatian nation defended ... itself and the largest part of the
Muslims.46
The Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had the least reason to
be satisfied.  At the end of 1992 it had the worst relationship
between their size and the territory under its control.47
Efforts by representatives of the international community to
end the war resulted in the well known Vance-Owen plan at the
beginning of 1993.  This plan transformed Bosnia and
Herzegovina into ten provinces.  The basis of the plan was the sit-
uation on the ground.  It seems that the Croats and Serbs were
satisfied with the territory under their control.  Areas in Central



























HVO Central Bosnia and the 3rd Corps of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina with the delimitation into provinces, this problem was
to be resolved.  The HVO in the early days of January 1993,
believing that the war was over, undertook measures to fulfill its
obligations arising from the Geneva Conference.  The HVO
also requested plans of minefields and assessments of necessary
manpower to control the extant front-lines.48 The National
Assembly of the Srpska Republika passed on December 17, 1992
a Declaration on the end of the war that, inter alia, concluded that
the ethnic-religious war in former Bosnia and Herzegovina
has ended and that the Serbian nation has defended its inde-
pendence and sovereign state the Srpska Republika.49  
Under these circumstances it can be asserted without reser-
vation that the Croats were satisfied with their situation in the
spring (more accurately the winter, author’s note) of 1993 and
the Croats had no reason to open a conflict with the
Bosniacs.50 The conflict that erupted in mid-January 1993 is
rarely a good basis to hide the true causes of the conflict, two
irreconcilable political concepts about the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.
War within “War”
The Muslim-Croat conflict that continued throughout 1993
had its causes in the early days of the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  The SJB (Office for Public Security) in Bugojno
delivered ammunition only to Muslim members of the special
police forces, along with instructions that they hide their stash from
Croatian members of the force.  In Gornji Vakuf relations between
Croats and Muslims were tense.  Although these two sentences
may be apt descriptions of the situation by the end of 1992 and
the beginning of 1993, they were written on April 1, 1992 in the
regular daily report by the “impartial” Command of the 30th
Partizan Division of the JNA, which immediately before the conflict
erupted had the Kupres plateau zone of responsibility, the river
Vrbas to the broader area of Janja.51
The suspicious relations noted by the military intelligence of
the 30th Partizan Division was a regular pattern in the areas in
which there was a rough balance between two or more nations,
that is in areas where the size of one nation was not large enough
to dominate over another.  In such areas one nation was not able
to dominate convincingly on another.  In this sense, we can assert
that in principle two types of national composition existed in prin-
ciple in Bosnia and Herzegovina, areas with a balance and areas
that were ethnically clear in which one “constitutive” nation had
an obvious majority.  The conflicts that erupted in 1992 turned


























The only exception to this “principle” was the conflict in Sarajevo
in the settlement of Stup, where the small Croatian oasis in an
area populated mainly by Muslims.  
It seems that in the Uskoplje area, around Gornji Vakuf, the
first incidents between the HVO and the Territorial Defense
occurred at the end of April.  They reoccurred on June 20 and 21,
1992.53  At the beginning of May, a conflict erupted in
Busovaèa,54 which reoccurred the following month.55 In Novi
Travnik on the afternoon of June 19, 1992 a conflict between
units of the Headquarters of the Territorial Defense and units from
the HVO and the Croatian Armed Forces (HOS).56 Inter-ethnic
tensions increased also in Konjic,57 which led to conflicts by the
end of August in Kiseljak.  However, in the first phase of the
Muslim-Croat tensions August 17, 1992 has a special signifi-
cance.  On this day, units of the Territorial Defense of Bosnia and
Herzegovina attacked the Croatian village of Stup in Sarajevo.
This incident differed from previous incidents on a local level
because of its impact on Croats in Sarajevo and raises the impor-
tant question about the origin of such an action.58
The chronology of the conflict between HVO and the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina that is known widely in the public begins
with events in Prozor.  It was preceded by tensions that lasted
throughout October between the HVO and the Territorial Defense
of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Central Bosnia, but primarily in
Travnik.  Tensions were lifted by Sarajevo Television after it broad-
cast a special “Documentary” on alleged massacres of Territorial
Defense soldiers in the village of Lješæe, while in fact the pictures
were actually of members of the HVO from Travnik.  The massacre
occurred on May 15, 1992 in Vlašiæ, committed against HVO
members by Chetnik forces.  Following this there was gunfire and
armed attacks against members of HVO officer corps from
Central Bosnia and their colleagues in the village of Rastovci, in
the county of Novi Travnik.  In the village of Karaula members of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina fired at the car of the HVO
Commander of Jajce.59 A conflict of words between HVO and the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina over a petrol pump in Novi
Travnik leads to the murder of the Commander of the Travnik
Brigade along the Travnik-Vitez route.  The local commander of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had declared that it was
’either the Petrol station or war.’60 The HVO accused members of
the 7th Muslim Brigade for the murder.61
The deterioration of security in the Central Bosnia Operative
Zone frequently spread from Gornji Vakuf to the edges of areas
along the Operative Zone North-western Herzegovina.62 The
HVO General Headquarters on October 21, 1992 reported that
in Gornji Vakuf and Prozor the situation is tense and that at



























situation in parts of the operative zone all measures will be
undertaken to preserve security to prevent any conflict
between HVO and OS of Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially
in Gornji Vakuf and Prozor.63
The conflict occurred in fact on October 23, 1992 and ended
with the total defeat of the local forces of the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  The claim that HVO prepared a surprise attack
against the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in Prozor is very
courageous,  and it is based purely on prejudice.64 At a meet-
ing between HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina held
on November 6, 1992 in Jablanica, representatives of the latter
accepted the HVO request to replace its commander of the
County Defense Headquarters in Prozor.65 This is a fact that is not
insignificant in analyzing the conflict.66
The other main problem in relations between HVO and the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina is the existence of two parallel
political and military structures in the central areas of Bosnia and
north-western Herzegovina.  They are a reflection of deeply held
distrust and divergent perspectives on the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  The relevant issue for historians is to answer the
question of what where the efforts of SDA and HDZ to resolve this
problem?
This problem is well illustrated in statement by a member of
the war presidency of the County Assembly (SO) of Novi Travnik:
The fundamental problem in Novi Travnik is the existence of
two authorities, the HVO and ours, as well as the regular one.
This has led to collisions and conflict.  And they will reoccur in
the future.  They do not allow the President of the Government
to enter the County without his identification being controlled.
It is better to separate.  We will fight again.  There were vari-
ous proposals that the Muslims and Croats form their own
governments.  We have tried to give each nation an equal
number of members in the government.67
The issue of parallel authorities was a crucial problem for
Croatian-Muslim relations in Central Bosnia, an area where the
conflict escalated.  Examining the causes of the conflict in Prozor,
the Commander of the Operative Zone North-western
Herzegovina correctly concluded that the only preventive measure
to avoid such conflicts was to end the existence of two command
structures, two armies, and two logistics, etc.68 A similar view
was expressed by the Commander of the 17th Krajiška Brigade of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, assessing that one of the
problems in the failure to defend Jajce was the problem that a sin-
gle town was defended by two command structures.69
However, the most widely known attempt to resolve the problem
of parallel authority was the order by the Minister of Defense of

























This order was interpreted in a recent book about this issue in fol-
lowing terms: “The Minister of Defense of Bosnia and
Herzegovina Bo o Rajiæ (HDZ) ordered that in the operative zone
in areas covered by provinces 3, 8 and 10 (Posavina,
Herzegovina with Livno-Duvno areas, parts of central Bosnia with
Travnik and Lašva) units of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
submit to the Main Headquarters, which was rejected by the for-
mer.”70 A similar interpretation can be found in the Hrvatski lek-
sikon.71 For the sake of historical truth, we have to state that such
an interpretation cannot be supported.  The order under exami-
nation consists of 9 points, but only point 2 is discussed.  In point
1, the order stipulates that “all units of the Croatian Defense
Council (HVO), which find themselves in the areas under
provinces 1, 5 and 9, which are defined as Muslim provinces
under the Geneva agreement fall under the command of the Main
Headquarters of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina.72 While the
editors of the Hrvatski leksikon could be excused because of
superficial and lack of understanding of the problem, this could
not be said of the compiler of the chronology for the collection of
essay The War in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina 1991-
1995 because in one of the essays there is, although rare, an
accurate interpretation of the order.73
From the military perspective the order was uncontroversial.  It
was an unsuccessful attempt to define the zone of responsibility
and authority after both sides had a clearer picture of its position
in time, space and most importantly, objectives.  However, it
seems that this is precisely the reason that it was rejected by one
side and why the politicians responded as they did with a focus on
the military component.
The third major issue in Muslim-Croat relations was provoked
by the third party, the Serbs with their occupation efforts and prac-
tice of ethnic cleansing.  The shear mass of refugees and dis-
placed persons from areas under the control of the Army of the
Srpska Republika into Muslim-Croat areas.  A part went to
Croatia and further abroad, while males competent for military
service remained.  In this way, the ethnic structure was changed,
especially in the mixed areas in Central Bosnia that lead to a new
balance of power between Croats and Muslims.  A majority of
refugees came from rural areas into urban settings, bringing with
them a different approach and way of life.  Cities in ethnically
mixed areas had an experience with multi-ethnicity, which was not
in principle the case in the villages.74 The changes to the ethnic
structure strengthened the position of the Muslims.  The HVO was
aware of this, and the HVO in Gornji Vakuf adopted a character-
istically undefined political position about the future, stated in one
of its reports from mid-June 1992 that after a second conflict with



























our area there are approximately 12,000 refugees from D.
Vakuf (all of Muslim nationality) with a large number in military
service, so that the further that they arm themselves, they rep-
resent a danger to our county and the neighboring counties
(Bugojno, Novi Travnik, Travnik).  We conclude that we their
primary enemies, and only then the Chetniks.75 After local
Muslim-Croat conflicts, one of the first Croatian demands was for
the withdrawal of foreigners from county areas.76
A Lack of Tact
One of the most interesting issues of the war in Bosnia and
Herzegovina is the problem of cooperation between HVO and the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina in the struggle against the JNA,
or rather, the Army of the Srpska Republika.  In the main part, the
greatest degree of cooperation began after the Washington
Agreements of March 18, 1994.  
The most interesting and intriguing period before that was
1992.  In the first months of the war both sides were concerned
with establishing their armed forces.  Croatia literally tried to cre-
ate something out of nothing by relying minimally on the former
republican structure of territorial defense, while the Mulsim-
Bosniac inherited elements of the Territorial Defense with a
strengthening of the officer corps with those that left the JNA.  The
main problem in relations between HVO and the Territorial
Defense, or rather the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, was
exactly the officer corps, which included elements who had fought
in the war in Croatia against the Croatian nation.77 Within HVO,
part of the officer corps also had experience in the war in Croatia,
naturally on the other side.  Both sides, unsurprisingly, were sus-
picious towards each other.
After the signing of the Agreement on Friendship and
Cooperation between the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and the Republic of Croatia in Zagreb on July 21, 1992, condi-
tions for cooperation between HVO and the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina were created.78 It was not until autumn of 1992 that
an effort towards cooperation was made.  The factor that stood in
the way was differing views on the future of Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  A demonstrative example is the unsuccessful meet-
ing between civil and military representatives of Gornji-Vrbas and
Lašva region held on August 15, 1992 in Travnik.  An agreement
wasn’t reached because of mutual Croat-Muslim recrimination
about Muslim unitarism and the role of Croatian responsibility for
the situation in the region.  In his conclusion in a report of the
meeting, the representative of the County Headquarters of HVO
Gorni Vakuf stipulated that the President of the Assembly of the
Travnik County stated that where Serbs and Muslims lived,
Muslims suffered, where Croats and Serbs lived, Croats suf-170
fered, and where Croats and Muslims live, both are alive and
well, but without an agreement.79
The nature of this cooperation seems to be described aptly in
a report of the Operative Zone of Central Bosnia about impres-
sions from the first meetings between the highest official repre-
sentatives of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and HVO in
Sarajevo.  The head of the Main Headquarters of HVO com-
plained that the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina had not contacted as yet
the Main Headquarters of the HVO.  Petkovic brings forth the
fact that the Main Headquarters was not contacted by tele-
phone, or that any thing else was done.  On the other side, the
Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina and organs of the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina contacted the Croatian
Armed Forces (HOS) from Ljubuski, which has 180 soldiers,
which is the equivalent of a company.  As he stated, you are
sending your people to Ljubuski to contact Blaz Kraljevic with-
out my knowledge and in my zone of responsibility.  In the
future we will arrest anyone entering our zone of responsibili-
ty without my knowledge.  You have invited Kraljevic and
Primorac, and they have attended meetings in Sarajevo, but
you didn t invite anyone from HVO.  If you want to continue
working on a joint defense you have to respect our results and
us.  When and how the politicians agree to a joint command,
the HVO will respect that.80 The Presidents of the Republic of
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina met on November 1, 1992
in Zagreb to discuss cooperation.  The meeting resulted in a joint
command, headed by Colonel Jaganjac and General Praljak.
Time demonstrated that this was not acceptable, mainly within the
ranks of the Bosniac-Muslim side.81
In discussing efforts to promote Croat-Muslim cooperation,
there seems to be the false and baseless impression that only the
HOS stood for cooperation as a mixed armed group made up of
Croats and Muslims.  In this respect, it viewed that the murder of
the Commander of HOS Bla  Kraljeviæ on August 2, 1992 was
the advocate of a Croat-Bosniac alliance.82 This view “converts”
the media’s problematical HOS from the war in Croatia as a
group into a group whose dissolution is greatly regretted.  The
Serbian perspective on this problem is illustrated well by the
assessment of the command of the 30th Partizan Division at the
beginning of 1992, in which he concludes that the HOS ... is con-
sidered as the most extremists part of the Croatian forces, even
Tuðman has distanced himself from them, but they are still sent to
the front lines.83 However, the HOS did not act as a united for-
mation on the entire territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina.  The
Section of the State Security Service in Zenica at the end of June



























area of Novi Travnik.  In the June 19 conflict, HOS took part on
the side of HVO.84
The Guilty and Prejudices
In analyzing the contemporary historical process is an
extremely difficult task.  If that process, such as the “story of Bosnia
and Herzegovina” is not complete, then it is even more difficult.
Contemporary historiography in many respects is specialized in
relation to the study of earlier periods.  Due to technological
advances, generally high levels of literacy and the emergence of
new media, the contemporary period there are ample documents
with an abundance of facts and information.  On the one hand,
this enables unprecedented access to local and apparently less
important historical levels.  On the other hand, the sheer number
of facts carries with it the constant danger of selective analysis,
focusing on only the minimum number of selected arguments to
“firmly” prove a desired image.  So there is a legitimate question
whether it is at desirable to wait for “historical distance” of 30 to
50 years after which the archives are opened, and when the
“story” from the perspective of the participants, journalists and
publicists refined prejudices are mercilessly unwrapped and
turned into a “witch hunt.”
All that is necessary is to look at Croatian or Muslim-Bosniac
press to see what the problem is.  In mid-March of 2000, we find
in the widely circulated Globus weekly an article about the for-
mation and the command structure of HVO and read, inter alia,
that Mate Boban’s decision on establishing the Croatian Arms in
Bosnia and Herzegovina was made ... as early as 1991, and that
in June 1991 an improvised Main Headquarters was established.
The journalist erred for one year that the General Headquarters of
HVO General M. Petkoviæ under international pressure was
replaced in the second half of 1993 by General Slobodan Praljak.
In fact, General Praljak was named the commander of HVO,
while General Petkoviæ further remained the Head of the Main
Headquarters.  That General Praljak after the destruction of the
Old Bridge in Mostar did not initiate an investigation, which is
inaccurate because he could no longer initiate such an investiga-
tion because he was no longer the Commander of HVO.  That
General Praljak as the Commander of HVO was replaced by
General Stanko Matiæ, which is not accurate because that former
General Major of the JNA was the assistant head of the Main
Headquarters of HVO at the time that General Praljak departed.
That the command “confusion” within HVO mistook Janko
Bobetko, Four Star General of the Croatian Army as the
Commander of the Southern Command.  It is sufficient to look at
All My Battles that General Bobetko at the end of 1993, the rel-
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evant time under discussion, was the head of the Main
Headquarters of the Croatian Army for almost a year.85
This example is mentioned because it relates to the most
transparent element of a military organization.  Moreover, the
organization can be reconstructed on the basis of civilian and mil-
itary newspapers, which are available to the widest possible audi-
ence in institutions such as the National University Library in
Zagreb.
The majority of publications referred to in this analysis fall
within the category of cultivated Muslim-Bosniac publicity that
does not reflect the formal qualifications of the author.  So, in the
case of Brigadier General Hasan Efendiæ, former JNA officer and
the first Commander of the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, his
book Who Defended Bosnia? is far more authoritative than that
of the professional historian Dr. Smail Èekiæ’s Aggression
against Bosnia and the Genocide against Bosniacs 1991-
1993.86
The publication The War in Croatia and Bosnia and
Herzegovina 1991-1995 is the last to appear on the topic of war
in Bosnia and Herzegovina.  Apart from the authoritative article by
the historian M. A. Hoare, attention should be given to the
chronology of the war.  Although we have mentioned some of the
questionable aspects of this chronology, it is worthwhile to exam-
ine another flaw.
We can read that on December 18, 1992 the HVO assumed
authority on all the areas under its control: it dissolved the law-
ful county assembly, replaced the mayors and members of the
local administration who were against confrontation with the
Bosniacs, disarmed the remaining Bosniac soldiers (except in
Posavina).  The HVO and the Army of Bosnia and
Herzegovina are largely homogenized and powerful political
opponents.87 Although we were unable to verify the first claim,88
the second one is a total fabrication.  Multiethnic forces in Bosnia
and Herzegovina really only existed in the HVO, primarily because
in the operative zones of South-eastern Herzegovina and
Bosanska Posavina.89 To the ultimatum of the 1st Brigade of HVO,
the Command of the 42nd Mountain Brigade of the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina responded in mid-April 1993, inter alia,
with the following words: W e remind you that you are well
aware that a large number of soldiers from the Muslim ranks
are within your armed forces, and they are Muslims and
belong to this nation, so it would be undesirable to damage
the existing organization and formation of your units.90 After
June 30, 1993 betrayal of a group of Muslims soldiers in HVO,
the Northern camp military base collapsed and the 2nd Brigade




























disarmament of distrusted soldiers,91 which was completed only by
the end of 1993, except for the area of Orašje.
It seems that the intention of the compiler of the chronology
was to show that a confrontation between HVO and the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina was unavoidable from the beginning of
1993.  The period between April 1992 and January 1993 was the
relevant period to study the political and military tensions between
HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or more accu-
rately, HDZ and SDA.  During this period the Republic of Croatia
made repeated, but unsuccessful efforts to move these relations
from a dead letter.92
At the end we should focus on some aspects of the war for the
period between January 1993 and the end of 1995.  Some of the
issues that need to be addressed before a “serious” assessment
can be made are, inter alia, the following:
There are three constitutive nations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.  The question is how to confront the fact that one of
the nations from the very beginning of the war had an undisclosed
intention to destroy the state?  The next question relates to the fact
that this was also sought by two of three nations, and not neces-
sarily always the same two.93
If three constitutive nations are at war with each other, does
this mean that it is appropriate to describe the conflict as a civil
war?  The next difficulty is to describe the involvement of neigh-
boring countries.  The Republic of Croatia has been described as
an aggressor because it assisted HVO with logistics and man-
power.  At certain points of the war, Croatia assisted logistically
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina and permitted the organiza-
tion of its army on Croatian territory.94 The 1st Volunteers
Regiment “King Tomislav” actually became formally part of the
Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina, that is, the Territorial Defense.95
From the perspective of the Bosnian Serbs, this was an act of
aggression.  From the perspective of HVO, Croatia could be crit-
icized.  Croatia could also be criticized because the largest num-
ber of “holy warriors” in Bosnia and Herzegovina arrived through
Croatia.  With a good dose of irony about the question of
Croatia’s aggression against Bosnia and Herzegovina, it could it
be suggested that Croatia was the aggressor because rebel
Croatian Serbs from the Republic of Serbian Krajina assisted the
Bosnian Serbs in the summer of 1992 in battles for the Bosanska
Posavina.  The HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina
have the same attitude toward the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(SRJ).
What is the role of the international community?  What is the
significance of the infamous UN Security Council Resolution 713
on the embargo on the supply of arms and military supplies to

























moral responsibility and represent the direct assistance of the bet-
ter armed side, the Army of the Srpska Republika?  Does this
mean that the world (the Great Powers) from the perspective of
HVO and the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina took part in the
war along side the Army of the Srpska Republika against the other
two constitutive nations?97 Did not the international community by
accepting the reality, that is, the reality on the ground, place the
foundation stone of partition of Bosnia and Herzegovina firmly in
the ground?98 Amongst these issues belong also the unanswered
questions about the visit of the late President of the French
Republic and the UN “safe havens.”99
Was there a war against or in Bosnia and Herzegovina?100
If we accept the proposition that the war was against Bosnia and
Herzegovina, does this not mean that one nation is more “foun-
dational” that the other two?  Does this mean that the aggression
was committed from outside the borders of Bosnia and
Herzegovina?  This means that the Republic of Croatia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SRJ) are treated equally responsi-
ble.  Under this interpretation, it is forgotten that the Republic of
Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had a common war zone
around Bihaæ, so that the position of Croatia is significantly dif-
ferent to that of the SRJ towards Bosnia and Herzegovina.101
And where is the (dis)honorable role of the United Nations
Security Council and the international community, whose shadow
passed like a nightmare over the ruble of Bosnia and Herzegovina
and Croatia?
We are of the view that the war was both against and in
Bosnia and Herzegovina that was sanctioned by the international
community.  The Army of the Srpska Republika in trying to occupy
as much territory as possible committed ethnic cleansing and
egregious crimes.  The armed forces of the other two constitutive
nations in Bosnia and Herzegovina committed noticeably less war
crimes.  However, it is demonstrative that HVO is treated on the
same level as the Army of the Srpska Republika, while the role of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina is whitewashed.  However,
facts do not support this scenario.  The HVO and the Army of
Bosnia and Herzegovina have shared elements: they both have a
war against the other two constitutive nations; an attack on the
territorial integrity of the state; assistance from abroad; ethnic
cleansing; destruction of property of the enemy; concentration
camps and war crimes.  Is the “generally-accepted advantage” of
the Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina over the HVO only in a
name?
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